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Strange Defeat
How the New Consensus in Macroeconomics Let Austerity
Lose All the Intellectual Battles and Still Win the War 
J W Mason, Arjun Jayadev 
Macroeconomics in the United States today appears to 
be a site of intense controversy between supporters of 
more aggressive stimulus measures and supporters of 
austerity. These policy debates, while important, tend to 
obscure the strong methodological and theoretical 
consensus in the economics profession today. All major 
schools of mainstream macroeconomics are committed 
to a vision of the economy in which rational agents 
choose the optimal path over time, and in which any 
sources of instability are fully offset by a benevolent 
central bank, at least in normal times. These core 
intellectual commitments of modern economics have 
contributed to the weakness of efforts to reduce 
unemployment in the US and Europe. This paper first 
describes the intellectual failure of the most prominent 
arguments for austerity, and then argues that the deeper 
consensus in macroeconomics has nonetheless made it 
difficult to make consistent arguments for sustained 
deficit spending or for making lower unemployment a 
high priority relative to other macroeconomic goals.
In 2010, policymakers in the advanced industrialised world pivoted sharply away from the Keynesian policies they had briefl y espoused in the wake of the fi nancial crisis of 
2008-09. A confl uence of economic and political events 
meant that the fragile consensus in favour of expanding gov-
ernment expenditure broke apart. Contributing factors in-
cluded the sharp rise in public debt in much of Europe, largely 
due to government assumption of the liabilities of failing 
banks; the rise of “Tea Party” conservatives in the US following 
the November 2010 congressional elections; and the lack of a 
convincing political narrative about government expenditure. 
The Keynesian position was replaced, at least among elite 
policymakers, with a commitment towards fi scal consolidation 
and “austerity”. 
With the hindsight of three years it is clear that this histori-
cal recapitulation of the Keynesian versus “Treasury view” 
d ebate, 80 years after the original, and the consequent imple-
mentation of orthodox policies, was both tragic and farcical. 
Tragic, because fi scal retrenchment and rectitude prolonged 
depression conditions in the advanced economies and sen-
tenced millions to the misery of unemployment. Farcical, 
b ecause the empirical and theoretical foundations of whole-
sale austerity policies were almost comically weak. A few im-
plausible and empirically questionable papers were used to 
provide the intellectual cover for the pivot, despite the fact 
that each, in turn, was quickly discredited both on their own 
terms and by real life events. As Mark Blyth (2013) put it, “Aus-
terity didn’t just fail – it helped blow up the world.”
In the fi rst part of this paper, we review some of the most 
infl uential academic arguments for austerity, and describe 
how they collapsed under scrutiny. In the second, we broaden 
the focus and consider the “new consensus” in macroeconomics, 
shared by most pro-stimulus economists as well as the “auste-
rians”. We argue that this consensus – with its methodological 
commitment to optimisation by rational agents, its uncritical 
faith in central banks, and its support for the norms of 
“sound fi nance” – has offered a favourable environment 
for arguments for austerity. Even the resounding defeat of 
particular arguments for austerity is unlikely to have much 
lasting e ffect, as long as the economics profession remains 
committed to a view of the world in which lower government 
debt is always desirable, booms and downturns are just 
 temporary deviations from a stable long-term growth path, 
and in which – in “normal times” at least – central banks 
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can and do correct all short-run deviations from that optimal 
path. Many liberal, New Keynesian, and “saltwater” econo-
mists have tenaciously opposed austerity in the intellectual 
and policy arenas. But they are fi ghting a monster of their 
own creation.
Introduction
In April 2013, an infl uential paper (“Growth in a Time of 
Debt”) by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2010) that 
purported to show hard limits to government debt before caus-
ing sharp decreases in growth was the subject of an enormous 
amount of attention for the second time. Whereas in its fi rst 
airing, the paper became a touchstone for the austerity move-
ment across the advanced industrialised world, this time it 
was for less august reasons. Papers by Herndon, Ash and Pollin 
(2013) and by Dube (2013) showed the Reinhart-Rogoff study 
to have had serious mistakes in both construction and inter-
pretation. This was not the fi rst time that the academic case 
for austerity had been shown to be invalid or overstated. Two 
years earlier the major source of intellectual, support for im-
mediate fi scal retrenchment was provided by another paper 
(“Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes Versus Spending”), 
again by two Harvard economists – Alberto Alesina and Silvia 
Ardagna (2009). This too was shown almost immediately to be 
deeply fl awed, misapplying lessons from boom periods to 
 periods of recession, wrongly attributing fi scal consolidation 
to countries undergoing fi scal expansion, wrongly applying 
the special conditions of small open economies to the world at 
large, and other egregious errors (IMF 2010; Jayadev and 
 Konczal 2010). 
Below, we examine the claims of these key papers and their 
logical and empirical failings. But the weakness of these 
p apers invites a broader question: How could the wholesale 
shift to austerity have been built on such shaky foundations? 
While some of the blame must go to opportunism by policy-
makers and confi rmation bias by politically motivated re-
searchers, a large share of the blame rests with what is often 
called the “new consensus” in macroeconomic theory, a con-
sensus shared as much by austerity’s ostensible opponents as 
by its declared supporters.
The extent of the consensus in mainstream macroeconomic 
theory is often obscured by the intensity of the disagreements 
over policy, and by a certain confusion over labels. From the 
outside, the fact that macroeconomists can be classifi ed as 
“New Keynesians” and “New Classicals” suggests that the 
funda mental philosophical debates of the 1930s continue to 
divide the profession. For those sympathetic to John Maynard 
Keynes’ vision, the New Keynesians would logically seem to 
be on “their” side. In fact, however, the contending schools 
and their often heated debates obscure the more fundamental 
consensus among mainstream macroeconomists. Despite the 
label, “New Keynesians” share the core commitment of their 
New Classical opponents to analyse the economy only in 
terms of the choices of a representative agent optimising over 
time. For New Keynesians as much as New Classicals, the only 
legitimate way to answer the question of why the economy is 
in the state it is in, is to ask under what circumstances a 
 rational planner, knowing the true probabilities of all possible 
future events, would have chosen exactly this outcome as the 
optimal one. Methodologically, Keynes’ vision of psycholo-
gically complex agents making irreversible decisions under 
conditions of fundamental uncertainty has been as com-
pletely repudiated by the “New Keynesians” as by their 
conservative opponents.
In this piece, we refer to New Keynesian, “saltwater”, and 
“liberal” (in the American sense) economists. While the fi rst of 
these is a defi nite body of theory, the second is a broader world 
view, and the third is a political orientation, in practice they 
overlap heavily.1 Whenever we use these terms, we are de-
scribing the left edge of the economic mainstream in the US 
currently, we are emphatically not describing the limits of po-
tentially possible policy for the US currently, or of directions 
for legitimate economic inquiry. We are, however, describing 
a set of commitments shared by the vast majority of working 
macro economists and advanced students. There is a much 
wider fi eld of economics beyond this consensus, from the 
postwar economics of Samuelson, Solow and Tobin, to the 
radical (or “heterodox”) Keynesian economics kept alive at 
places like UMass-Amherst, The New School, and the University 
of M issouri-Kansas City, to the various traditions of Marxism. 
But since these schools currently have little or no infl uence on 
policy in the US or in Europe, they are outside the scope of 
this article.
One striking illustration of the consensus in modern macro-
economics is that the most effective theoretical counterpoint 
to the austerity position is provided not by cutting edge 
scholar ship, but by a straightforward application of models 
that college students learn in their second year. Paul Krugman, 
for instance, most often makes his claims that “economic 
t heory” has well-established answers to the problem of deep 
recessions, by referring to the investment saving-liquidity model 
(IS-LM). This was fi rst written down by John Hicks in 1936. 
That it is being trotted out now as the public face of a profes-
sional economics to which it bears no resemblance, is remark-
able. But it is perhaps less of a surprise when one recalls that 
the essential insights of Keynesian economics have long been 
banished from mainstream economics, to linger on only in 
“the Hades of undergraduate instruction” (Leijonhufvud 1981). 
Modern macroeconomic theory is organised around inter-
temporal optimisation and rational expectations, while policy 
discussions are dominated by a commitment to the doctrines 
of “sound fi nance” and a preference for “technocratic” mone-
tary policy conducted by “independent” central banks. The 
historical processes that led to these commitments are com-
plex. For present purposes, what is important to note is that 
they severely limit the scope of economic debate. The need for 
“structural reform” and for long-term budget balance is agreed 
across the admissible political spectrum, from pro-austerity 
European conservatives to American liberals who savour the 
memory of Clinton era debt reduction. Even someone like 
Paul Krugman, who has been the foremost critic of austerity 
policies, treats the idea that governments do not face fi nancing 
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constraints, and that macroeconomic policy cannot be fully 
trusted to central banks, as special features of the current 
p eriod of “Depression Economics”, which must sooner or later 
come to an end. Mainstream Keynesians then become modern 
day Augustines: “Give me chastity and continence, but not yet”.
The Rise and Fall of Austerity Economics
In 2010, Alberto Alesina from Harvard University was cele-
brated by Business Week for his series of papers on fi scal con-
solidation. This was “his hour”, the article proclaimed (Coy 
2010). His surprising argument that the best way forward for 
countries facing high unemployment was to undertake “Large, 
credible and decisive spending cuts” was, for a while, on every-
one’s lips. Such cuts, he reasoned, would change the expecta-
tions of market participants and bring forward investment 
that was held back by the uncertainty surrounding policy in 
the recession. Specifi cally, Alesina and Ardagna (2009) purpor-
ted to show that across a large sample of countries, governments 
had successfully cut defi cits, reduced debts and seen higher 
growth as a result. The mechanism by which this occurs, en-
hancing the confi dence of investors in countries with “credible” 
governments, thereby raising investment – has been derisively 
l abelled “the confi dence fairy” by Paul Krugman.
This idea of “expansionary austerity” – the notion that cut-
ting spending would increase growth – is both an attack on 
traditional notions of demand management and also extra-
ordinarily convenient for conservative macroeconomic policy-
makers. Not only would reducing the defi cit and debt burdens 
of countries advance their long-term goal of reducing the size 
of the state, it would raise spending even in the short term, 
since the confi dence effects of fi scal surpluses on private 
e xpenditure would more than offset any drag from the public 
sector contraction. Even better, consolidation was better 
a ccording to Alesina and Ardagna (2009) if it was weighted 
towards spending cuts, rather than tax increases. As Coy 
(2010) notes “The bottom line: Alesina has provided the theo-
retical ammunition fi scal conservatives want.” 
As Blyth (2013) documents, this idea obtained immediate 
traction among policymaking elites and by mid-2010 the idea 
of defi cit reduction in a period of weak demand (which might 
otherwise have been deemed nonsensical) was receiving sup-
port from high-level policymakers who spoke knowingly about 
the immediate need to restore “confi dence” in the markets. 
Thus, for example Jean Claude Trichet, the president of the 
European Central Bank, observed: 
It is an error to think that fi scal austerity is a threat to growth and job 
creation. At present, a major problem is the lack of confi dence on the 
part of households, fi rms, savers and investors who feel that fi scal 
policies are not sound and sustainable.2
As Blyth notes, while the argument for expansionary auster-
ity was enthusiastically endorsed by policymakers (especially 
but not only in Europe), the intellectual case collapsed almost 
immediately. The paper was... “dissected, augmented, tested, 
refuted and generally hauled over the coals” (Blyth 2013). First, 
Jayadev and Konczal (2010) noted that none of the alleged 
cases of expansionary austerity occurred during recessions. 
They also noted that in some cases Alesina-Ardagna had 
m isclassifi ed periods of fi scal expansion as periods of fi scal 
consolidation. Immediately following this, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF 2010) noted that the way in which 
Alesina-Ardagna had classifi ed fi scal policy as being expan-
sionary or contractionary seemed to have very little connection 
with actual fi scal policy changes. In terms of both effects and 
causes, the empirical work turned out to be valueless for policy.
Faced with mounting challenges to his work, Alesina 
appeared undeterred and defended his ideas while prognosti-
cating on the future of Europe: 
In addition, what is unfolding currently in Europe directly contradicts 
Jayadev and Konczal. Several European countries have started drastic 
plans of fi scal adjustment in the middle of a fragile recovery. At the 
time of this writing, it appears that European speed of recovery is sus-
tained, faster than that of the US and the ECB has recently signifi cantly 
raised growth forecasts for the Euro area (Alesina 2010). 
Three years on, this confi dent prognostication is an embarass-
ment. The Washington Post, taking stock of the argument, con-
cluded “No advanced economy has proved Alesina correct in the 
wake of the Great Recession” (Tankersley 2013). Not only did 
austerity not deliver higher growth: in the countries that tried it, 
output contracted more or less exactly in line with the degree of 
austerity they managed to impose (Degrauwe and Ji 2013). 
But just as the case for short-term fi scal consolidation was dis-
integrating in the eyes of all but a few diehard believers, a new 
set of arguments became the intellectual bulwark of the auster-
ity movement. As the Greek debt crisis spun out of control and 
interest rates on sovereign debt rose elsewhere in the European 
periphery, concern with public debt rose even in countries like 
the US, where bond markets were untroubled and yields on gov-
ernment debt remained at record lows. For respectable opinion, 
the question was when, and not if, government debt needed to 
be cut, if we don’t want to “turn into Greece”.3
It was at this point that the paper by Reinhart and 
Rogoff struck its mark. Using a panel of data on growth and 
government debt over many decades, Reinhart and Rogoff 
came up with a magic number – a 90% government debt to 
gross domestic product (GDP) ratio – beyond which economies 
faced a sharp drop-off in growth rates. 
As with expansionary austerity, this argument caught on 
very quickly with policymakers. It was cited by David C ameron, 
Olli Rehn and Paul Ryan, among others, to justify a push for 
deep, immediate debt reduction. Unlike the Alesina-Ardagna 
paper, this one was not easily refuted. For one thing, the con-
struction of the paper made it diffi cult for other researchers to 
try to replicate the results. But despite some early warnings 
about interpretations of the data (Bivens and Irons 2010; 
F erguson and Johnson 2010), this diffi culty was generally 
i nterpreted as a reason to defer to its fi ndings rather than as a 
basis for scepticism. Second, and more insidiously, there is 
widespread agreement among mainstream economists that 
high government debt must eventually reduce growth, and so 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s work was received without much critical 
scrutiny. The 90% threshold seemed to simply confi rm a 
widely-accepted principle.
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It is not surprising therefore that the errors in Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s work were discovered by researchers decidedly out of 
the mainstream. Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash and Robert 
Pollin, all from the University of Massachusetts Amherst – a 
department that has been called the “single most important 
heterodox department in the country” – published a paper in 
April 2013 which showed that the Reinhart-Rogoff results were 
the consequence of coding errors and omissions and non-
standard weighting of data. The 90% drop-off in growth dis-
appeared when these errors were corrected. 
Even more devastatingly, Arindrajit Dube (2013) (also from 
the University of Massachusetts) showed that if at all there 
was a c orrelation between debt and growth, it was more 
likely that episodes of low growth led to higher levels of 
debt rather than the other way around. Again, this counter 
argument had been made by opponents of austerity and 
could have easily been verifi ed by supporters of austerity or 
Reinhart and Rogoff themselves, but simply had not been 
taken seriously.
With the key intellectual arguments for the austerity con-
sensus falling apart before their eyes, the commentariat went 
into overdrive, speculating on the reasons why such policies 
could be adopted with such little vetting. 
The media proposed various relatively benign reasons: con-
fi rmation bias, opportunism by politicians, etc. But while these 
were surely factors, they surely do not explain the catastrophic 
failure of the Economics profession to offer a rational basis for 
policy discussion.
James Crotty has provided a larger political economy framing 
of the austerity wars (2012). He suggests that austerian policies 
should be seen as class confl ict – protecting the interests of the 
wealthy and attacking those of the poor, and that these battles 
should be seen as the latest skirmish in a longer war of ideas and 
priorities. Austerity, from this viewpoint, is less an intellectual 
failure than a deliberate choice r efl ecting the political domi-
nance of fi nance capital and capital in general.4 
Our purpose in this paper is to more deeply explore the bat-
tle of ideas and the extent to which the “macroeconomic con-
sensus”, shared by mainstream economists across the political 
spectrum, must take a large part of the blame. Many liberal 
“New Keynesian” economists have done yeoman work in mak-
ing the political case for stimulus and against austerity. But 
they have not yet come to terms with the role their own theo-
retical and policy frameworks played in the turn to austerity – 
and continue to impede realistic discussion of the crisis and 
effective responses to it. 
The Hegemony of Consensus Macroeconomics
While there is much to admire in the doggedness of the UMass-
Amherst team (and the alacrity with which a network of left-
leaning bloggers and media fi gures publicised their results) 
the truth is that knocking down Alesina and Ardagna, and Re-
inhart and Rogoff’s results was not diffi cult. The real question 
is, how was such crude work so successful in the fi rst place?
The easy answer is that it was telling policymakers what 
they wanted to hear. But that lets the Economics profession off 
too easily. For the past 30 years the dominant macroeconomic 
models that have been in use by central banks and leading 
macroeconomists have had very little time and space for 
d iscussions of fi scal policy. In particular, the spectrum of mod-
els really ranged only from what have been termed real busi-
ness cycle theory approaches on the one end to New Keynesian 
a pproaches on the other: perspectives that are considerably 
closer in fl avour and methodological commitments to each 
other than to the “old Keynesian” approaches embodied in 
such models as the IS-LM framework of undergraduate eco-
nomics. In particular, while demand matters in the short run 
in New Keynesian models, it can have no effect in the long run; 
no matter what, the economy always eventually returns to its 
full-employment growth path. 
And while conventional economic theory saw the economy 
as self-equilibrating, economic policy discussion was domi-
nated by faith in the stabilising powers of central banks and 
in the wisdom of “sound fi nance”. Perhaps the major reason 
R einhart and Rogoff’s work went unscrutinised for so long is 
that it was only putting numbers on the prevailing consensus. 
This is clearly seen when one observes that some of the 
same economists, who today are leading the charge against 
austerity, were arguing just as forcefully a few years ago that 
the most important macroeconomic challenge was reducing 
the size of public debt. More broadly, work like Alesina- 
Ardagna and Reinhart-Rogoff has been so infl uential because 
the New Keynesians in the Economics profession do not pro-
vide a compelling argument in favour of stimulus. New Keyne-
sians follow Keynes in name only; they have certainly given 
better policy advice than the austerians in recent years, but 
such advice does not always fl ow naturally from their models.
There are two distinct failures here, one in economic theory 
and the other in discussions of economic policy.
The Limited Support for Fiscal Expansion 
in ‘Frontier’ Theory 
On a theoretical level, professional economists today are com-
mitted to thinking of the economy in terms of intertemporal 
optimisation by rational agents. In effect, the fi rst question to 
ask about any economic outcome is, why does this leave people 
better off than any alternative? In such a framework, agents 
know their endowments and tastes (and everyone else,) and 
the available production technology in all future periods. So 
they know all possible mixes of consumption and leisure avail-
able to them over the entire future and the utility each pro-
vides. Based on this knowledge they pick, for all periods simul-
taneously (“on the 8th day of creation”), the optimal path of 
labour, output and consumption (Leijonhufvud 1981). 
Given a framework in which an explanation in terms of opti-
misation is always the default, it is natural to think that un-
employment is just workers making an optimal choice to take 
their leisure now, in the knowledge that they will be more pro-
ductive in the future. In this view – mockingly termed the 
“Great Vacation” theory of recessions – stimulus is not only 
ineffective but unneeded, since the “problem” of high unem-
ployment is actually what is best for everyone. Most economists 
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would not accept this claim in its bald form. Yet they continue 
to teach their graduate students that the best way to explain 
changes in investment and employment is in terms of the 
o ptimal allocation of consumption and leisure over time. New 
Keynesians have spent a generation trying to show why the 
economy can move (temporarily) off the optimal path. The 
s olution to these deviations is almost always found in mone-
tary policy and only in very special circumstances can fi scal 
policy play a (limited) role.
De Grauwe (2010) distinguishes “Old Keynesian”, “New Key-
nesian” and “Real Business Cycle (Ricardian)” models. He notes 
that the latter two “state of the art” frameworks are similar in 
their framing and methodological commitments. As he puts it:
In the (Old) Keynesian model there is no automatic return to the long 
run output equilibrium. As a result, policy can have a permanent ef-
fect on output. The New Keynesian model, like the Ricardian model, 
contains a very different view of the economy. In this model fi scal policy 
shocks lead to adjustments in interest rate, prices and wages that tend 
to crowd out private investment and consumption. As a result, output 
is brought back to its initial level. In the Ricardian model this occurs 
very rapidly; in the New Keynesian models this adjustment takes time 
because of rigidities in wages and prices. But fundamentally, the struc-
ture of these two models is the same.
Moreover, in most cases, the “rigidities in wages and prices” 
in New Keynesian models are best handled by monetary 
p olicy. While these class of models are extremely large and 
varied, for the most part, in the New Keynesian approach, the 
key problem arises because periodically the interest rate gen-
erated by imperfect competition and pricing rigidities lead to a 
“wrong” real interest rate. As Simon Wren-Lewis argues:
Once we have the ‘wrong’ real interest rate, then (using imperfect 
competition as a justifi cation) New Keynesian analysis determines 
output and perhaps employment only from the demand side, and the 
determination of effective demand becomes critical to the model. Per-
haps a better way of saying this is that if real interest rates are at their 
natural level, we do not need to think about demand when calculating 
output. In most cases, it is the job of monetary policy to try and get the 
economy back to this natural real interest rate. This gives you the key 
insight into why, ZLB problems apart, it is monetary rather than fi scal 
policy that is the primary stabilising policy (Wren Lewis 2012).
New Keynesian Fiscal Policy
Indeed, the New Keynesian models that provide any support 
for fi scal policy only do so at the zero lower bound, where 
monetary policy has stopped being effective (And even here, 
the models can provide some tremendously counter-intuitive 
predictions that militate against common sense. For example, 
in the canonical model of policy at the ZLB, a payroll tax cut is 
contractionary, by the same logic that government expendi-
ture is expansionary (Eggertson 2010). Since nobody actually 
believes this odd result – liberal economists universally sup-
ported payroll tax cuts as part of the Obama stimulus package 
in 2009, and b emoaned the demand-reducing effects of the 
cuts’ expiration at the beginning of 2013 – it appears that even 
New Keynesians do not really believe their own models are 
useful guides to questions of stimulus and austerity.
Even if one does believe them, the truth is that New Keynesian 
models provide very little support for stimulus. With Ricardian 
equivalence built in, this is always going to be the case, but as 
Cogan et al (2010) show, the majority of these models provide 
very little empirical support for fi scal policy. Instead, the esti-
mates of effectiveness of fi scal expansion coming from the 
wide array of these models were very small indeed. 
Taken as a whole then, neither the New Classical nor New 
Keynesian theoretical approaches – those that dominate mod-
ern macroeconomics – afford a robust case for fi scal expan-
sion. It is not surprising therefore that Keynesians seeking sup-
port for stimulus have “retreated” to older Keynesian frame-
works like IS-LM. But this embrace of IS-LM is only for purposes 
of advocacy; in the journals and the graduate classrooms, New 
Keynesian models are as dominant as ever.5
On the specifi c question of government fi nances and the 
sustainability of debt, the analysis in any modern macro-
economics textbook is in terms of the intertemporal budget 
constraint. The core idea is that the present value of government 
spending across all future time must be less than or equal to the 
present value of taxation across all future time, minus the current 
value of government debt. This assumes that government must 
balance the budget eventually: After  infi nite time (this is how 
economists think), debt must go to zero. And it assumes that 
interest rates and growth rates cannot be changed by policy, 
and that infl ation makes no difference – any change in infl ation 
is fully anticipated by fi nancial markets and passed through 
one-for-one to interest rates. At the same time, the budget con-
straint assumes that governments face no limit on borrowing 
in any given period. This is the starting point for all discussions 
of government budgets in e conomics teaching and research. In 
many graduate macro economics courses, the entire discussion of 
government budgets is just the working-out of that one equation. 
But this kind of budget constraint has nothing to do with the 
kind of fi nancial constraint the austerity debates are about. 
The textbook constraint is based on the idea that government 
is setting tax and spending levels for all periods once and for 
all. There is no difference between past and future – the equa-
tion is unchanged if you reverse the direction of time and 
 simultaneously reverse the sign of the interest rate. This ap-
proach is not specifi c to government budget constraints, it is 
the way most matters are approached in contemporary macro-
economics. The starting point for most macroeconomic text-
books is the model of a “representative agent” allocating 
known production and consumption possibilities across an in-
fi nite time horizon.6 Economic growth simply means that the 
parameters are such that the household, or planner, chooses a 
path of output with higher values in later periods than in 
e arlier ones. Financial markets and aggregate demand are not 
completely ignored, of course, but they are treated as details to 
be added later, not part of the main structure.
One important feature of these models is that the interest 
rate is not the cost of credit or fi nance; rather, it is the rate of 
substitution, set by tastes and technology, of spending or 
taxing between different periods. The idea that interest is 
the cost of money, not the cost of substitution between the future 
and the present, was arguably one of the most important 
innovations in Keynes’ General Theory. But it has disappeared 
from contemporary textbooks, and without it there is not even 
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the possibility of bond markets limiting government budget 
o ptions. As soon as we begin talking about the state of con-
fi dence in the bond market, we are talking about a fi nancial 
constraint, not a budget constraint. But the whole logic of 
contemporary macroeconomics excludes the possibility of 
government fi nancial constraints. At no point in either of the 
two most widely-used macro textbooks in the US – Paul Romer’s 
Advanced Macroeconomics and Blanchard and Fischer’s L ectures 
on Macroeconomics – are they seriously discussed.
This framework at once overstates and understates the lim-
its on government fi nances. On the one hand, it ignores the 
positive possibilities of fi nancial repression to hold down the 
interest rate, and of growing or infl ating out of debt,7 and also 
the possibility – in fact certainty – that government debt can 
be held by the public permanently rather than being eventu-
ally paid off. But on the other hand, it also ignores reasons why 
governments might not be able to borrow unlimited amounts 
in any given period. (This goes for private budget constraints 
too.) The theory simply does not have any place for questions 
about government borrowing.
A faulty Excel spreadsheet was able to carry the fi eld on 
stimulus and austerity because the economics profession had 
already limited itself to conceiving of the main problems of 
fl uctuations as either desirable or easily solved by monetary 
policy. But the limits of modern macroeconomic theory are 
only half the problem. The other half is the policy implications 
promoted by consensus macroeconomics – specifi cally, the 
consensus that all the hard policy questions can be delegated 
to the central bank. 
The Preference for Technical Monetary Policy
In the view of consensus macroeconomics, Keynes was right 
that markets alone cannot ensure the full use of society’s 
r esources. But that is only because of a single wrong price, the 
interest rate. Let a wise planner set that correctly, and every-
thing else will fall into place. Historically, this view owes more 
to Wicksell than to Keynes (Leijonhufvud 1987). But Wicksell 
was deeply worried by the idea that the market rate of interest, 
determined by the fi nancial system, could depart from the 
“natural” rate of interest required to balance demands for 
present versus future goods. For him, this was a grave source 
of instability in any fully developed system of credit money. 
For modern economists, there is no need to worry: the prob-
lem is solved by the central bank, which ensures that the rate 
of interest is always at the natural rate. Lost in this updating of 
Wicksell is his focus on the specifi c features of the banking 
system that allow the market rate to diverge from the natural 
rate in the fi rst place. But without any discussion of the specifi c 
failures that can cause the banking system to set the interest 
rate at the “wrong” level, it is not clear why we should have 
faith that the central bank can overcome those failures. 
Nonetheless, faith in monetary-policy “Maestros” became 
nearly universal in the 1990s as the cult of Greenspan reached 
full fl ower in the US, the European Central Bank came into b eing 
as the commanding institution of the European Union, and 
central banks replaced government ministries as the main locus 
of economic policy in many countries. Respectable mainstream 
economists fl irted with fatuity in their paeans to the wisdom 
of central bankers. In a somewhat ill-timed issue of the Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, Goodfriend (2007) a rgued that
The worldwide progress in monetary policy is a great achievement 
that, especially when viewed from the perspective of 30 years ago, is a 
remarkable success story. Today, academics, central bank economists, 
and policymakers around the world work together on monetary policy 
as never before ... The worldwide working consensus provides a foun-
dation for future work because it was forged out of hard practical les-
sons from diverse national experiences over decades, and because it 
provides common ground upon which academics and central bankers 
can work to improve monetary policy in the future.
Christina Romer (2007), a leading American New Keynesian 
who was soon to lead Barack Obama’s Council of Economic 
Advisors, was even more obsequious in her praise for the 
 wisdom of central bankers:
The most striking fact about macropolicy is that we have progressed 
amazingly. ...The Federal Reserve is directly responsible for the low infl a-
tion and the virtual disappearance of the business cycle in the last 25 
years. ...The story of stabilisation policy of the last quarter century is one 
of amazing success. We have seen the triumph of sensible ideas and have 
reaped the rewards...Real short-run macroeconomic performance has 
been splendid. …We have seen a glorious counterrevolution in the ideas 
and conduct of short-run stabilisation policy. 
This was, to put it mildly, an overstatement.
As far as the capabilities of central banks go, there is reason to 
doubt that they have the decisive infl uence on real economic 
outcomes that the conventional wisdom of the 2000s attributed 
to them. Short-term interest rates appear to have ceased having 
much effect on longer rates and on economic activity well be-
fore they reached zero. And if central banks could always guar-
antee full employment assuming positive interest rates, there 
would undoubtedly be ways to work around the problem of 
zero rates – committing to more expansionary policy in the 
f uture, intervening at longer maturities through quantitative 
easing, and so on. But while the US Federal Reserve and other 
central banks – such as the Bank of Japan – have tried many of 
these unconventional approaches, they have had little impact. 
This failure should raise serious questions about whether the 
effectiveness of conventional policy was also exaggerated. The 
relative stability of output and employment prior to 2008 may 
not have been, as widely believed, due to the skillful hand of 
central bankers on the economy’s tiller, but to favourable condi-
tions that were largely outside their control. And in any case, 
that stability is easy to exaggerate. In the US and Europe, the 
s o-called “Great Moderation” featured asset bubbles and long 
“jobless recoveries,” while in much of the developing world it 
witnessed a series of devastating fi nancial crises and repeated 
collapses in employment and output. 
For economists who received their training under the mon-
etarist consensus that has dominated policy discussions since 
the 1980s, the terms “effective demand failure” and “monetary 
policy error” were practically synonyms. This notion that the 
central bank can achieve any level of money expenditure that 
it wishes has always been a matter of faith rather than reason 
or evidence. But it was a very convenient faith, since it allowed 
the consensus to remove the most contentious questions of 
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macroeconomic policy from the democratic process, and vest 
them in a committee of “apolitical” experts. 
And that is the other problem with the cult of the central 
bankers: They have never really been apolitical. Mainstream 
economists have made the disinterestedness of central banks 
into an axiom – in standard macro models, the “reaction func-
tion” of monetary policy has the same status as an objective fact 
about the world as, say, the relationship between unemploy-
ment and infl ation. It is taken for granted that while elected 
 offi cials may be corrupt or captured by particular interests, central 
bankers are disinterested technicians who only want what is 
best for everyone, or at least always follow their stated rules. For 
prominent liberal economists like Alan Blinder (who served on 
the Fed board under President Clinton), the performance of 
“apolitical” central banks is so exemplary that it becomes an ar-
gument against political democracy in general:
We have drawn the line in the wrong place, leaving too many policy 
decisions in the realm of politics and too few in the realm of technoc-
racy. ...the argument for the Fed’s independence applies just as force-
fully to many other areas of government policy. Many policy decisions 
require complex technical judgments and have consequences that 
stretch into the distant future. ...Yet in such cases, elected politicians 
make the key decisions. Why should monetary policy be different? ...
The justifi cation for central bank independence is valid. Perhaps the 
model should be extended to other arenas. ...The tax system would 
surely be simpler, fairer, and more effi cient if...left to an independent 
technical body like the Federal Reserve rather than to congressional 
committees (Blinder 1987).
The idea of leaving hard questions to “independent techni-
cal bodies” is seductive. But in practice, “independent” often 
means independent from democratic accountability, not from 
the interests of fi nance. Private banks have always had an out-
size infl uence on monetary policy. In the early 1930s, according 
to economic historians Gerald Epstein and Thomas Ferguson, 
expansionary monetary policy was blocked by pressure from 
private banks, whose interests the Fed put ahead of stabilising 
the economy as a whole (Epstein and Ferguson 1984). More 
recently, in the 1970s and 1980s, for the Fed of this era, hold-
ing down wages was job number one, and they were quite 
aware that this meant taking the side of business against labour 
in acute political confl icts. And when a few hi-profi le union 
victories, like the 1997 successful strike of UPS drivers, briefl y 
made it appear that organised labour might be reviving, Fed 
offi cials made no effort to hide their displeasure:
I suspect we will fi nd that the [UPS] strike has done a good deal of dam-
age in the past couple of weeks. The settlement may go a long way to-
ward undermining the wage fl exibility that we started to get in labor 
markets with the air traffi c controllers’ strike back in the early 1980s. 
Even before this strike, it appeared that the secular decline in real wag-
es was over (quoted in Mitchell and Erickson 2005).
Europe today offers the clearest case of “independent” cen-
tral banks taking on an overtly political role. The ECB has 
r epeatedly refused to support the markets for European sover-
eign debt, not because such intervention might fail, but 
p recisely because it might work. As Deutsche Bundesbank 
president Jens Weidmann put it last year, “Relieving stress in 
the sovereign bond markets eases imminent funding pain but 
blurs the signal to sovereigns about the precarious state of 
public fi nances and the urgent need to act” (Financial Times, 
7 May 2012). In a letter to the Financial Times (1 June 2012), 
one European bank executive made the same point even more 
bluntly: “In addition to price stability, [the ECB] has a mandate 
to impose structural reform. To this extent, cyclical pain is 
part of its agenda.” In other words, it is the job of the ECB not 
simply to maintain price stability or keep Europe’s fi nancial 
system from collapsing, but to infl ict “pain” on democratically 
elected governments in order to compel them to adopt “re-
forms” of its own choosing.
What the ECB means by “reforms” was made very clear in a 
2011 memo to the Italian government, setting out the condi-
tions under which it would support the market in Italian debt. 
The ECB’s demands included “full liberalisation of local public 
services…particularly…the provision of local services through 
large scale privatizations”; “reform [of] the collective wage 
bargaining system...to tailor wages and working conditions to 
fi rms’ specifi c needs...”; “thorough review of the rules regulat-
ing the hiring and dismissal of employees”; and cuts to private 
as well as public pensions, “making more stringent the eligibil-
ity criteria for seniority pensions” and raising the retirement 
age of women in the private sector8 (quoted in Corriere della 
Serra, 29 September 2011).
Privatisation, weaker unions, more employer control over 
hiring and fi ring, skimpier pensions. This goes well beyond 
the textbook remit of a central bank. But it makes perfect sense 
if one thinks that central banks are not the disinterested ex-
perts but representatives of a specifi c political interest, one 
that stands to gain from privatisation of public goods and 
weakened protections for workers.
Certainly many economists do not support the kind of slash-
and-burn “reform” being promoted by the ECB. But for the 
most part, consensus macroeconomics endorsed the delega-
tion of all macroeconomic policymaking to central banks, in-
sisted that monetary policy was a matter for technical exper-
tise and not democratic accountability, and downplayed the 
real confl icting interests involved. This opened the way to a 
power grab by the central banks, on behalf of the owners of 
 fi nancial wealth who are their natural constituents.
The theoretical commitment to an economy where markets 
optimally arrange work, consumption and investment across 
all time, and the practical commitment to central banks as sole 
custodians of macroeconomic policy: These were undoubtedly 
the two most important ways in which the New Keynesian 
mainstream of economics prepared the way for the success of 
the austerian Right. A third contribution, less fundamental but 
more direct, was the commitment of economists to the tenets 
of “sound fi nance”. 
Commitment to ‘Sound Finance’
The term “sound fi nance” was adopted in the 1940s by the 
p ioneering American Keynesian Abba Lerner, to describe the 
view that governments are subject to the same kind of budget 
constraints as businesses and households, and should there-
fore guide their fi scal choices by the dangers of excessive debt. 
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He contrasted this view with his own preferred approach, 
“functional fi nance”, which held that government budget deci-
sions should be taken with an eye only on the state of the 
macro economy. High unemployment means higher spending 
and lower taxes are needed, high infl ation the opposite; the 
government’s fi nancial position is irrelevant. 
Consensus macroeconomics has a strong commitment to the 
idea of sound fi nance. But this commitment is more refl exive, 
emotional or psychological than based on any coherent vision 
of the economy. As a resut, liberal, “saltwater” economists 
waver between incompatible views depending on the rhetorical 
needs of the moment. On the one hand, when stimulus is 
r equired, they dismiss the idea of fi nancial constraints, and 
reject the idea of some threshold above which the costs of 
p ubic debt rise precipitously. This was the heart of the Reinhart 
and Rogoff dispute, and the 90% threshold was the (dis-
proven) cliff. But on the other hand, they invoke the very same 
cliffs when arguing for surpluses in good times that they 
 dismiss when arguing for stimulus in bad ones. 
This idea that the infl ationary constraint on government 
spending is logically the primary constraint on government 
spending is rarely promoted. Instead appeals to unobservable 
“cliffs”, nonlinearities and future collapses in confi dence 
d ominate the conversation about government spending. The 
then ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet was roundly attacked 
by the pro-stimulus economists for arguing, in 2010, in the 
depths of Europe’s recession, that it was time to cut defi cits 
and raise interest rates, on the grounds that:
the economy may be close to non-linear phenomena such as a rapid 
d eterioration of confi dence among broad constituencies of house-
holds, enterprises, savers and investors. My understanding is that 
an overwhelming majority of industrial countries are now in t
hose uncharted waters, where confi dence is potentially at stake. 
Consolidation is a must in such circumstances (Trichet 2010). 
As the critics rightly pointed out, there is no evidence or 
systematic argument for these “nonlinear responses”. The 
Reinhart-Rogoff paper was intended to provide exactly such 
evidence; its usefulness to conservative policymakers like Tri-
chet was undoubtedly part of the reason for its success. The 
problem is the collapse of Reinhart-Rogoff has hardly touched 
the larger vision of even the richest countries’ governments as 
perpetually teetering on the edge of a fi nancial cliff. And one 
reason for the persistence of this vision is that it is shared by 
many of Reinhart-Rogoff’s liberal critics.
Here again is Christina Romer – one of the country’s leading 
“Keynesian” economists – arguing in 2007 that the biggest 
macroeconomic problem facing the country is that policymakers 
are not suffi ciently worried about holding down government 
debt. True, she admits, there is no direct evidence that high 
public debt has caused any problems so far. But
It is possible that the effects of persistent defi cits are highly nonlinear. 
Perhaps over a wide range, defi cits and the cumulative public debt re-
ally do have little impact on the economy. But, at some point, the debt 
burden reaches a level that threatens the confi dence of investors. Such 
a meltdown and a sudden stop of lending would unquestionably have 
enormous real consequences (Romer 2007).
Soon after giving this speech, Romer would be one of the 
leading advocates within the Obama administration for a 
larger stimulus bill. Lined up against her were economists 
such as Larry Summers and Peter Orszag. The conservatives’ 
arguments in that debate recapitulated the language 
Romer herself had been using less than two years before. Sum-
mers, in a contemporary account, “believed that fi lling the out-
put gap through defi cit spending was important, but that a 
package that was too large could potentially shift fears from 
the current crisis to the long-term budget defi cit, which would 
have an unwelcome effect on the bond market” (Lizza 2009).
Mainstream New Keynesian economists want to argue that 
lack of fi scal space is never a constraint on stimulus in bad 
times, but that gaining fi scal space is a reason to run surpluses 
in good times. Logically, these two views are contradictory. 
After all, “With low debt, fi scal policy is less costly” and “With 
high debt, fi scal policy is more costly” are just two ways of say-
ing the same thing. But the mainstream of the economics pro-
fession has so far failed to face up to this contradiction. Liberal 
American economists seem unable to accept that if they give 
up the idea of a threshold past which the costs of public debt 
rise steeply, they must also give up the main macroeconomic 
argument in favour of the Clinton surpluses of the 1990s. Most 
critics of austerity are reluctant to admit that if high debt is not 
a constraint on stimulus in bad times, then it is not sensible to 
talk about “paying for” stimulus with surpluses in good times. 
Instead, they remain committed to the idea that government 
surpluses are defi nitely, absolutely needed – not now, but at 
some point in the future, they say. But that only cedes the 
moral high ground to the principled austerians who insist that 
surpluses are needed today.
The Problem Is in the Economics Profession
In the stimulus vs austerity wars of the past four years, the 
New Keynesians who make up the left wing of the mainstream 
consensus have undoubtedly been on the right side of many 
big policy questions. Case by case, they certainly have the bet-
ter arguments. But they have no vision. And so their victories 
over Alesina-Ardagna or Reinhart-Rogoff, count for much less 
than you might expect, since in the end, the vision of the econ-
omy, of the economics profession, and of economic policy 
hardly differs between the two camps. Alternative views of the 
macroeconomy exist, but they are simply ignored.
In this light, it is interesting to compare Krugman’s 2009 
New York Times magazine piece with his 2013 New York Review 
of Books piece. In the earlier article, while he has plenty of 
criticism of politicians, he makes it clear that the insidious 
problem is in economics profession. Even the best economists, 
he writes, prefer mathematical elegance to historical realism, 
make a fetish of optimisation and rational expectations, and 
ignore the main sources of instability in real economies. In 
2009, Krugman was scathing about “the profession’s blindness 
to the very possibility of catastrophic failures in a market eco-
nomy”, and made it clear that better policy would require bet-
ter economics. He was unsparing – and insightful – about his 
own school as well as his opponents. The New Keynesian mod-
els used by “saltwater” economists like himself, he wrote, still 
“ assume that people are perfectly rational and fi nancial markets 
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are perfectly effi cient.” He was scornful of the all-purpose ex-
cuse that “no one could have predicted”, insisting that the 
world faced “disasters that could have been predicted, should 
have been predicted”. 
In the 2013 piece, this self-critical tone is gone. Now, the 
economics profession as a whole is almost completely exoner-
ated. Their “failure to anticipate the crisis”, he writes, “was a 
relatively minor sin. Economies are complicated, ever-changing 
entities; it was understandable that few economists realised” 
the fragility of the system before the crisis. Instead, his fi re is 
all aimed at politicians, who “turned their back on practically 
everything economists had learned”. The economists who 
have given intellectual support for austerity are reduced in 
this telling to a few outliers, a marginal clique. As a whole, he 
now says, the profession understands the problem properly; 
the lack of a proper solution is a sign of “just how little good 
comes from understanding”. Building a better economics 
seemed both urgent and promising in 2009; four years later, 
that project has been abandoned.
Conclusions
It is too easy to dismiss the idea of the pivot to austerity as 
b eing the failure of fl awed papers or as political opportunism 
alone. Such an analysis misses the fact that, for the majority of 
the economics profession, the ideas of stimulus and especially 
fi scal policy have always been intellectually uncomfortable 
while the arguments for austerity and sound fi nance come 
naturally. A conception of macroeconomic dynamics in which 
the economy was by its nature unstable and central banks 
could not be relied on to stabilise it was diffi cult even to 
d escribe in the language of the mainstream. This state of 
a ffairs is what Gramsci would identify as hegemony.
The 2008 fi nancial crisis and the multiple subsequent crises 
it engendered did seem to shake that hegemony. For a brief 
period, it became obvious that writers such as Keynes, Bage-
hot, Minsky and even Marx had much more to provide in terms 
of explanation and solutions than were available from the kind 
of macroeconomic taught in graduate classes and published in 
the top journals. But as time has gone on and memories of the 
crisis have faded, the consensus has reasserted itself. No-
where, perhaps, has this been more evident, and more conse-
quential, than in the austerity wars.
If Krugman got it right the fi rst time and macroeconomists 
have no answers to today’s urgent questions, and not just that 
politicians will not listen to them – the question, then, is what 
is to be done? There are those who argue that there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with the ways in which macroeconomics is 
studied, that it is just a matter of adding a few more frictions. 
But this is simply the traditional cherished belief of intellectual 
endeavours that the discipline always improves on itself. As 
any historian of ideas might suggest, this narrative of con-
tinuously closer approximation to the truth is often a myth, and 
intellectual “progress” is often down a blind alley or wrong turn.
In Axel Leijonhufvud’s eloquent essay on the value of study-
ing the history of economic thought (Leijonhufvud 2002), he 
offers the metaphor of a traveller who fi nds himself at a dead 
end in the road. If he is very bold, he might try to scale the 
walls (or bushwhack through the forest) blocking the path. But 
often, it is better to backtrack, to see if there was a turnoff 
somewhere earlier on the road that looked less promising at 
the time but in retrospect might have been a better choice. 
This, he suggests, is the situation of economics today. In this 
case, further progress means, fi rst of all, looking back to ear-
lier points in the discipline’s evolution to see what of value 
might have been overlooked.
How far back we need to go – how long ago did economics 
take the wrong turn that led us to the current impasse? Was 
it 40 years ago, when the rational expectations revolution 
overturned Gordon’s “Economics of 1978”, which had less 
faith in central banks and was perhaps better suited to 
describing economies as systems evolving in time? Or was it 
75 years ago, when Keynes’ radical insights about funda-
mental uncertainty and the inherent instability of the capital-
ist investment pro cess were domesticated by writers like 
Hicks and Samuelson in the neoclassical synthesis? Or was it 
150 years ago, when the classical tradition of Ricardo and 
Marx – with its attention to dynamics, and central concern 
with distributional confl ict – was displaced by the marginalist 
approach that made economics primarily about the static 
problem of effi cient allocation? We do not here suggest that 
there is nothing worth keeping in the current macroeconomic 
canon, but we think these earlier traditions suggest impor-
tant routes forward that have been abandoned. Indeed, those 
economists who worked in alter native traditions (Minskyan, 
Post-Keynesian, Marxist, and even Austrian) had a much 
more robust vocabulary for making sense of the crisis and 
the responses to it.
The industrialised world has gone through a prolonged 
p eriod of stagnation and misery and may have worse ahead of 
it. Probably no policy can completely tame the booms and 
busts that capitalist economies are subject to. And even those 
steps that can be taken will not be taken without the pressure 
of strong popular movements challenging governments from 
the outside. The ability of economists to shape the world, for 
good or for ill is strictly circumscribed. Still, it is undeniable 
that the case for austerity – so weak on purely intellectual 
grounds – would never have conquered the commanding 
heights of policy so easily if the way had not been prepared for 
it by the past 30 years of consensus macroeconomics. Where 
the possibility and political will for stimulus did exist, modern 
economics – the stuff of current scholarship and graduate edu-
cation – tended to hinder rather than help. While when the 
turn to austerity came, even shoddy work could have an out-
size impact, because it had the whole weight of conventional 
opinion behind it. For this the mainstream of the economics 
profession – the liberals as much as the conservatives – must 
take some share of the blame.
Notes
1   For the purposes of this article, “liberal” refers to the left side of main-
stream US politics, as opposed to conservative. “New Keynesian” refers to a 
particular methodology in macroeconomics, which combines the Wal-
rasian general-equilibrium framework of neoclassical economics with a 
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Economic & Political Weekly EPW  august 10, 2013 vol xlviiI no 32 111
specifi c set of “frictions” that allow for superfi -
cially Keynesian results in the short run, in-
cluding some form of aggregate demand. This 
is opposed by “New Classical” economists, who 
believe that the long-run models they and the 
New Keynesians share should be used for the 
short run as well. “Saltwater” refers to one side 
of a sociological divide within the economics 
profession, with saltwater economists more ec-
lectic, more willing to modify their models as 
needed to describe particular events or support 
particular policies, while “freshwater” econo-
mists are more committed to logically consistent 
reasoning from fi rst principles. 
2  See European Central Bank, Interview with 
Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, and 
Liberation, 8 July 2010.
3  For example, Laurence Kotlikoff (2011) – a 
r espected fi nancial economist – argued, “The 
fi nancial sharks are circling Greece because 
Greece is small and defenceless, but they’ll 
soon be swimming our way.”
4  It is interesting in this regard that a recent pa-
per by the IMF addresses the distributional 
e ffects of austerity (Ball et al 2013). The 
a bstract alone confi rms the Crotty viewpoint: 
“This paper examines the distributional effects 
of fi scal consolidation. Using episodes of fi scal 
consolidation for a sample of 17 OECD coun-
tries over the period 1978-2009, we fi nd that 
fi scal consolidation has typically had signifi -
cant distributional effects by raising inequali-
ty, decreasing wage income shares and increas-
ing long-term unemployment. The evidence 
also suggests that spending-based adjustments 
have had, on average, larger distributional 
e ffects than tax-based adjustments”.
5  For a sense of what a serious academic develop-
ment of “IS-LM-style” models could look like, 
the best starting point is probably the work 
of Lance Taylor, particularly Reconstructing 
Macro economics (Taylor 2004).
6  It is somewhat ironic that the specifi c growth 
model that is most often used is the version de-
veloped by Robert Solow, since Solow himself 
is quite critical of the turn towards intertempo-




7  This is also ironic because Reinhart and Rogoff 
have both argued (albeit unenthusiastically) 
for fi nancial repression or infl ation.
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